Why the road-freight rate to the EU must return to an economically justified corridor?
Dear partners,
This letter is deliberately open and public. We are not bargaining behind closed doors, and we are not lodging a claim against any single company. We are showing all our partners a calculation drawn from our own trip journal, and we ask for one thing: to return the price of carriage to a corridor that covers the cost of the haul, leaves the carrier a normal margin, and does not consume the export from which that margin is earned.
Zaporizhabraziv produces electrocorundum, silicon carbide and abrasive grain, and sells them to processors in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria and other EU countries. The buyer compares our consignment not with a slogan, but with the Brazilian, European and — where the duty allows — Asian equivalent. In that arithmetic, logistics is part of the price by which both the plant and the carrier of its product win or lose the contract.
For January–September 2026 the journal records 898 European trips with freight in euro and the invoice in euro. The median rate in the first quarter was €2,050. The median in the third quarter was €2,800. The increase is 36.6%. The median invoice moved from €18,700 to €19,483, that is only 4.2%. Tonnage remained about 21 tonnes. Distance did not change. The price per kilometre did.
1. What the trip journal shows
Source — the plant’s operational road-transport journal as of 2 October 2026. Sample: valid freight from €500, invoice in EUR, freight not marked as dollar-denominated.



2. The formulas from which a justifiably lower rate follows
Logistics share: w = F / V × 100%.
F is the freight of the trip, V is the invoice amount. First quarter: median w = 10.9%. Third quarter: 14.4%. The target is w ≤ 11%, with a working guide of 10.5–10.8%.
Specific freight: f = F / T.
T ≈ 22 t. First quarter: f ≈ €95/t. Third quarter: f ≈ €131/t. The target is €85–100/t, guide €95/t, that is €1,870–2,200 per trip.
Increase in the rate: Δ = (F₃ − F₁) / F₁ = (2,800 − 2,050) / 2,050 = 36.6%.
The invoice changed by 4.2%. Fuel, road tolls and the driver’s wage did not rise by a third in eight months. The difference is rent, not indexation.
Annual saving for the exporter: E = (F_actual − F_target) × N.
F_actual = €2,800, F_target = €2,100, ΔF = €700 per trip. The pace is 100 European trips a month. E ≈ €840 thousand a year. This is a resource for the price to the buyer, or for additional trips — not a discount for its own sake.

3. Cost of the haul
Model of a loaded Zaporizhzhia–Central Europe haul, about 1,900 km. This is an analytical reconstruction with stated assumptions, not an extract from any particular carrier’s accounts.

Margin at the third-quarter rate on an effective cost of €2,100: m = (F − C) / C = (2,800 − 2,100) / 2,100 = 33%.
One third above cost on a regular paid haul is excess profit. War risk and the queue were already in the first-quarter rate, near €2,050. There is no ground for loading them a second time in the third quarter. The fair corridor, with a margin of 8–12%, is €2,050–2,350.

Dollar hauls in 2026: 145 trips, median freight $3,490, median share of the invoice 14.3%. In the spring the median rose to $5,155–5,300 and the share to about 19–20%. This is a different product; it must be calculated separately. The logic is the same.
4. Why excess profit hits the carrier itself
Carrier revenue on the plant’s portfolio: R = F × Q.
Relative change: R₂ / R₁ = (F₂ / F₁) × (1 + ε × (F₂ − F₁) / F₁).
F₁ = €2,800, F₂ = €2,100, F₂/F₁ = 0.75. A 25% cut in freight reduces the cost of the delivered lot by 3.6 points of the invoice (14.4% × 0.25). The EU buyer does not so much cut consumption of abrasive as switch supplier, so we take ε in the range −0.6 to −1.2.
Scenario A. Rate €2,800, volume −15%: R_A / R₁ = 0.85.
Scenario B. Rate €2,100, ε = −0.6, volume +15%: R_B / R₁ = 0.75 × 1.15 = 0.86.
Scenario C. Rate €2,100, ε = −1.2, volume +30%: R_C / R₁ = 0.75 × 1.30 = 0.98.
Scenario D. Contract lost within 12–18 months: R_D / R₁ → 0.

The difference of €700 per trip, at a pace of 100 trucks a month, is about €0.84 million a year. That money either keeps Ukrainian abrasive grain inside the buyer’s specification, or finances additional trips at the target rate. Less export means fewer trucks. More export means work for everyone ready to run at a justified price.
A forwarder’s excess profit on regular export harms the shipper directly: either the plant’s margin is cut, or the price rises and the volume goes to a competitor. In both cases a long contract becomes impossible. A partner who earns more on the customer than the customer can bear on the EU market is not a partner for three years.
5. The proposal
Why this is written in the open
Because the rate of recent months is already a signal to everyone who hauls abrasive grain from Zaporizhzhia. To hide the calculation would be to ask for a discount. An open letter means something else: here is the journal, here is the formula, here is the corridor in which we are ready to guarantee volume. Whoever enters this corridor gets the long haul. Whoever remains on the third-quarter rent remains on the spot market, for as long as the spot market lasts.
Zaporizhabraziv has operated since 1939 and has kept its export to the EU throughout the war. This is not seasonal cargo. A forwarder who carries it at a price that can stand against Turkish abrasive grain will earn more on this haul than on three months of excess profit. We are ready to put your actual costs into the formula. We are not ready to pay a rent that makes Ukrainian corundum unsaleable on the market for which these trucks are running.
Yours sincerely,
Oleksandr Kozeratskyi
Chairman of the Board
Zaporizhzhia Abrasive Plant PJSC